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In February 2017, in a decision which was quickly translated into English, the French
constitutional council ruled as unconstitutional a law that prohibited the usual consultation
of terrorist websites. A few days later, the Parliament reinstated a modified version of this
offense. It was, however, struck down again by the Constitutional Council on December
15th 2017.
I. The Constitutional Council’s ruling
The goal of Parliament was to prevent the indoctrination of individuals who may have gone
on to commit terrorist acts. The Parliament wished to enable the authorities to intervene at
the earliest stages. An individual should be stopped and punished before he takes his
terrorist project to the next level.
This statute thus raised a classical problem of criminal policy, made only more stringent in
the context of liberal democracies facing terrorism: the difficult balance between liberty and
security. Criminal law can indeed intervene before the occurrence of the harmful
consequence that the state wishes to prevent. But there has to be a limit to this approach:
the most efficient way to avoid terrorist attacks would be to forbid everyone to leave their
home.
The Constitutional Council ruled that the statute under review was an unnecessary
restriction of freedom of expression. There were less severe means that could just as
efficiently contribute to the prevention of terrorist acts and the protection of public safety.
French law already contains many provisions allowing the competent authorities to stop an
individual who is preparing a terrorist attack. There is no need to go further upstream, and
to intervene at the stage of the consultation of websites, even before a terrorist intention
can be identified.
The gap between, on the one hand, the act of usually accessing terrorist websites, and, on
the other hand, the perpetration of a terrorist attack, seems too large. There is not a
sufficient risk at this stage to justify criminalization. One cannot regard each usual viewer of
such sites as a terrorist in the making.
II. The difference between the speaker and the reader
At first glance, this reasoning of the Constitutional Council – made more explicit here for the
readers of this blog – seems convincing. A slight surprise stems from the fact that the
French law governing freedom of expression does not reject the “bad tendency” test. In
many statutes, there is no requirement for the offense to include a “clear and present
danger” condition, according to which the feared consequence of speech will very likely
happen. The reasonable estimation that the expression leads to an abstract danger is
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enough. For instance, incitement to terrorism can be sentenced without verifying that the
expression gives rise to a serious risk of terrorist acts being committed. The Constitutional
Council does not seem to have any issue with such laws.
To understand the present ruling, one must keep in mind that there is a difference between
restricting the freedom of expression of the speaker, and the much less frequent instance
where the law targets the receiver of a message. Prohibiting access to the medium for
expression implies that one assumes that each and every isolated reader is at risk of
committing harmful acts as a result of his reading. By contrast, prohibiting certain
expressions means only that there is a reasonable danger that some of its receivers will be
moved to unlawful or violent acts. In other words, there is a higher abstract risk associated
to the act of publishing a message than in the isolated act of reading it. The Constitutional
Council refuses to assume that each usual reader of terrorist websites will probably take
action, even if – as the statute also requested – his consultation is accompanied by the
manifestation of adherence to the ideology expressed on the websites. Further indications
of risk must appear, the individual must move closer to the preparation of an attack, in
which case other laws already exist and can be applied.
III. Terrorists and paedophiles
The Constitutional Council did not pay any attention to a further element of the law, that
could have led to another form of reasoning. The usual consultation of terrorist websites
could lead to punishment only if those websites included “images or representations of
[terrorist] acts that consist in voluntary attacks on life”. Therefore, focusing on the
prevention of the harm likely to be inflicted by the reader of the websites might not be the
only way to deal with this statute. The Constitutional Council could have focused on the
harm to the participant, i.e. the harm endured by the victims of the acts whose pictures are
included on the website. This line of reasoning is, for example, the only justification for the
prohibition of the production, the distribution or the possession of child pornography in the
United States. It should also be relevant for the consultation of websites depicting child
pornography or beheadings and other murders.
However, this reasoning could not entirely apply to the law under review. Not only does this
law targeted websites that display “pictures”, but it also refered to the mere “representation”
of homicides, i.e. also the “virtual” representations of such acts. Justifying such laws by
focussing on “participant harm” cannot apply in this case: this explains why the Supreme
Court of the United States repealed the criminalisation of virtual child pornography.
Therefore, the commented decision of the Constitutional Council leads one to question the
conformity to the constitution of article 227-23 of the criminal code, which served as a
model to the repealed law. In its fifth paragraph, this article prohibits the “usual
consultation” of websites that include pornographic “images or representations” of minors.
The word “representation” was added to the law in 1998 with the express objective to
include virtual child pornography. Clearly, then, the “participant harm” reasoning cannot
apply. The law must be justified with reference to the harm that might be inflicted by an
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individual as a consequence of his website consultation. Is this risk higher for a paedophile
site than for a terrorist one? The Constitutional Council might well have to answer this
question shortly.
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